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Abstracts
Background: Highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus has been shown to infect organs other than the lung, and
this is likely to be mediated by systemic spread resulting from viremia which has been detected in blood in severe
cases of infection with avian H5N1 viruses. The infectivity of virus in blood and the potential for virus transmission
by transfusion has not been investigated.
Methods: Using a susceptible ferret animal model, we evaluated viremia and transmission by blood transfusion.
Blood was collected on day 2, 4, 6, and 10 post-infection (or before death) from donor ferrets infected with either
low dose (1.0 × 102.6 EID50/ml) or high dose (1.0 × 10
3.6 EID50/ml) of H5N1 virus, A/VN/1203/04 and transfused to
recipient animals.
Results: Viremia was observed in 2/12 (16.67%) recipients that received blood from donor ferrets infected with low
dose and 7/12 (58.33%) recipients who received blood from high dose infected donors. 1/12 (8.3%) low dose
recipients and 6/12 (50%) high dose recipients died within 11 days after transfusion. Increased changes in body
weight and temperatures were observed in high dose recipients, and high levels of viral RNA were detected in
recipient ferrets after transfusion of blood from the early viremic phase, which also correlated with adverse impact
on their survival.
Conclusion: These data suggest that highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus, H5N1, is transmissible by blood
transfusion in ferrets. Low levels of viremia were detected around the time of onset of symptoms and later in
ferrets infected with highly pathogenic H5N1 virus. These findings may have implication for pathogenesis and
transmissibility of H5N1.
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Background
Influenza A viruses belong to the Orthomyxoviridae family
of RNA viruses that contain eight segments of negative
sense RNA [1]. There are several subtypes, numbered
according to antigen HA and NA, containing sixteen
different HA antigens (H1 to H16) and nine different
NA antigens (N1 to N9) have been identified to date. In-
fluenza A viruses evolve with high mutation rates and
can occasionally cross the species barrier. Highly patho-
genic avian influenza virus H5N1 originated in poultry
and has been occasionally transmitted to humans resulting
in high mortality [2]. There have been no reports thus
far to indicate that H5N1 is readily transmissible from
human to human.
H5N1 virus continues to circulate among poultry in
many countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe, occasionally
spreading to humans. In 1997, avian influenza A virus
subtype H5N1 emerged capable of infecting humans with
a highly fatal disease outcome (fatality rate of ~60%) [3,4].
The primary pathologic process that causes death is ful-
minant viral pneumonia [3,5]. High replication efficiency,
broad tissue tropism and systemic replication seem to
determine the pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses in animals
[2,6]. A human isolate A/Vietnam/1203/04 (H5N1) was
reported to be highly pathogenic and the severity of dis-
ease was associated with broad tissue tropism and high
virus titers in multiple organs, including the brain in
ferrets [6].
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Some studies have shown that H5N1 virus is found
exclusively in the respiratory tract (mainly in the lung)
[7,8]. Other studies report the presence of H5N1 viruses
in many extrapulmonary organs, such as intestine, liver,
and brain [9-14]. Viral RNA has been detected in naso-
pharyngeal aspirates ranging from 1 day up to 15 days
after disease onset [15,16]. Viral replication appears to
be prolonged in H5N1 influenza because viral loads
when plotted against time did not show a clear decline
in a large group of H5N1 patients [17]. These findings
demonstrate that H5N1 can be detected in brain, intestine,
liver, lymph nodes, placenta, and fetal lung and cause
coma, diarrhea, and encephalopathy in children [18], in
addition to pneumonia.
Early in the 1960s, viremia was found in patients in-
fected with influenza A virus in Asia [11,12]. Since then,
other groups have reported that influenza viral RNA
could be detected in blood from infected patients
[17,19-22]. It has also been reported that detectable viral
RNA in the blood of humans was associated with fatal
outcomes while no viral RNA was detected in the blood
of surviving H5N1-infected individuals [17].
Ferrets are an excellent mammalian animal model for
studies of influenza virus pathogenicity and host immun-
ity, and disease manifestations of influenza virus infection
in ferrets closely resemble those in humans [6]. Recently,
we found that infection with a human isolate, A/Vietnam/
1203/04 (H5N1), resulted in viremia in the ferret model,
which positively correlated with animal death [6]. Viral
RNA could also be detected in brain, lung, ileum, nasal
turbinate, and nasal wash. Although influenza viruses
in blood and plasma are very stable [23], it is unclear
whether the influenza virus can be transmitted by blood
transfusion. Here, we performed studies in ferrets infected
with the H5N1 strain to determine whether influenza A
virus can be transmitted through blood transfusion.
Methods
Virus and its titer determination
A H5N1 strain, A/Vietnam/1203/04, was obtained from
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta,
GA) (CDC#2004706280, E1/E3 (1/19/07) and amplified
in 10–day old embryonated hen’s eggs (CBT Farms,
Chestertown, MD). The virus was maintained at −80°C
until use. For infectious titer determination 10-fold dilu-
tions of virus stock was inoculated into 10-day old embry-
onated hen’s eggs (4–8 eggs per dilution) and the eggs
were incubated for 48 hours. 50 μl of allantoic fluid was
then collected from each egg and added to a microtiter
plate. 50 μl of 0.5% turkey red blood cells (tRBCs) were
added to all wells and plates were incubated for 30 minutes
at room temperature. Plates were read for agglutination or
non-agglutination. The 50% endpoint was determined by
the method of Reed and Muench [24] from virus dilutions
testing positive for hemagglutinin activity in tRBCs.
Data were expressed as 50% egg infectious dose (EID50)
per milliliter.
Ferret inoculation and transfusion
Forty two adult male ferrets (Triple F Farms, Sayre, PA)
that were 6 ~ 7 months of age and seronegative for
representative currently circulating human influenza A
strains and the challenge virus prior to initiation of the
study were identified for the study. Ferrets were housed
and cared for at BIOQUAL, Inc. (Rockville, MD). The
BIOQUAL, Inc. IACUC had approved the animal care
and use proposal, ACUP # 11-3056-71, prior to start of
the study. For all procedures, the ferrets were lightly
anesthetized with a solution of ketamine/xylazine for-
mulated to provide doses of 25 mg/kg ketamine and
2.0 mg/kg xylazine to each animal. The animals (do-
nors) were inoculated intranasally with 500 μl of virus,
approximately 250 μl to each nare. Six donor ferrets
were infected with low dose, about 1.0 × 102.6 EID50/ml
of virus and the other 6 donors were infected with high
dose of about 1.0 × 103.6 EID50/ml of virus. For each
challenge dose, the donor animals were divided into two
groups; blood was collected on days 2 and day 6 post-
infection from one of these groups and on days 4 and
day 10 post-infection from the other group. At these
time points about 2 ml of freshly collected blood was
transfused into its appropriate recipient (see Table 1 for
details). To reduce the risk of a minor allergic reaction
the recipient ferrets were administered a dose of anti-
histamine (Benadryl, 2 mg/kg, IM) 5 min. prior to the
transfusion. A 24 gauge IV catheter was then inserted
into the cephalic vein and a blood line with filter was
connected. The anti-coagulated (acid citrate dextrose
(ACD). 0.48% (w/v) citric acid. 1.32% (w/v) sodium citrate.
1.47% (w/v) glucose) blood from one donor was slowly
pushed through the line over a 10–15 minute period. In
total, 24 recipients received blood from H5N1-infected an-
imals and 3 animals received blood from animals treated
with equal volume of PBS in each nare as controls.
Clinical signs of infection, weight, and temperatures
were recorded twice daily. Activity scores were assigned
as follows: 0, alert and playful; 1, alert but playful only
when stimulated; 2, alert, but not playful when stimulated;
and 3, neither alert nor playful when stimulated. Ferrets
that showed signs of severe disease (prolonged fever;
diarrhea; nasal discharge interfering with eating, drink-
ing, or breathing; severe lethargy; or neurological signs)
or had >20% weight loss were euthanized immediately.
Euthanasia was performed on ferrets that had been sedated
using IM inoculation with a ketamine HCl (25 mg/kg) and
xylazine (2 mg/kg) solution. Blood was obtained from re-
cipients on days 2, 4, and 8 post-transfusion (or before
animal death) and analyzed for viral loads using RT-qPCR.
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These studies were performed in a Biosafety level 3 en-
hanced laboratory.
Nasal wash
Nasal wash samples were collected from all ferrets on
days 0, 2, 4, 6, and 8 for viral load determination.
Briefly, the ferret was sedated with ketamine/xylazine
and placed in the laminar flow hood, draped over a
small box. With the nose pointed upwards, 3 ml PBS/
gentamicin/0.5% BSA solution is slowly instilled into
the nostrils using a 24 gauge ¾” plastic catheter con-
nected to a 3 ml syringe. The nasal wash was collected
into a 15 ml sterile conical tube, spun down to remove
cell debris. 0.5 ml sample was used for immediate isola-
tion of viral RNA, and an additional sample used for the
TCID50 assay. These procedures were performed in a
Biosafety level 3 enhanced laboratory.
RT-qPCR
Quantitative real-time RT-PCR was used for detection of
viral RNA in blood and nasal wash. 500 μl of blood or
nasal wash were used to isolate nucleic acids by using
the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Valencia, CA 91355)
according to the manufacturer’s protocol. We designed a
set of primers and probes for the matrix gene, M, of the
avian H5N1 influenza A virus, according to GenBank
database. The forward primer was 5′-CGTCAGGCCC
CCTCAAA-3′, and the reverse primer was 5′-GGTGTT
CTTTCCTGCAAAGA-3′. The TaqMan probe was oligo-
nucleotide 5′-TCAAGTTTCTGTGCGATCT-3′, coupled
with a reporter dye [6-carboxy fluorescein] (FAM) at the
5′ end, a non-fluorescent quencher and a minor groove
binder (MGB), that served as a Tm enhancer, at the 3′
end. The nucleic acids were amplified and detected in an
automated TaqMan 7500 Analyzer by using QuantiTect™
Probe RT-PCR kit (Qiagen Inc., Valencia, CA). The 25-μl
PCR mixture consisted of 100 nM primers and 100 nM
probe. Following three thermal steps at 55°C for 5 min,
at 50°C for 30 min and at 95°C for 10 min, 45 cycles of
two-step PCR at 95°C for 15 s and at 60°C for 1 min
were performed. The limit of detection was 1 fg of virus
RNA per reaction with the TaqMan assay initial sample
dilution at 1:10.
TCID50 assay
The nasal wash and plasma samples were added in 10-fold
graded dilutions to 96-well round-bottomed tissue culture
plates. As a positive control, 10-fold dilutions of the chal-
lenge virus were included in each experiment. MDCK cells
were then added to all wells and the plates incubated for
48 hr at 37°C, 5% CO2. Following this period 50 μL from
each well was transferred to a 96-well V-bottomed micro-
titer plate, 0.5% turkey RBC added to all wells and the
presence of virus detected by hemagglutination as a read-
out. The 50% endpoint was determined by the method of
Reed and Muench [17] from virus dilutions testing posi-
tive for hemagglutinin activity in Turkey Red Blood Cells
(tRBC). Data were expressed as 50% tissue culture infect-
ive dose (TCID50) per milliliter.
Statistical analysis
The log rank test was used for comparing survival curves
and the unpaired Student’s t test was used for other data
analyses as indicated, and a value of p < 0.05 was consid-
ered significant.
Results
Transfusion of viremic blood was associated with fatal
outcome in recipients
We infected 6 ferrets (donors) with 1.0 × 10 2.6 EID50/ml
(low dose) and another 6 animals with 1.0 × 10 3.6 EID50/ml
(high dose) of H5N1 virus, strain A/VN/1203/04. As shown
Table 1 Study design of donors and their appropriate
recipients
Donor group Animal code Day blood collected Recipient code
























PBS 49 4 88
50 6 89
62 10 90
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in Figure 1A, mortality in donors occurred at a higher
rate with high dose compared with low dose. Blood was
collected from infected animals (donors) as scheduled
(Table 1) or before the death of the animal and about
2 ml of the fresh blood was transfused to their appropri-
ate recipients (Table 1). Fatal outcomes were observed
in some recipient ferrets (Figure 1B). About 50% of fer-
rets died within 12 days post-transfusion of blood from
ferrets that were infected with a high dose of virus com-
pared with 10% of recipients from the low dose virus in-
fected group (Figure 1B). All control animals remained
healthy and symptom-free throughout the duration of
the study. These data suggested that the fatal outcomes
observed were likely to be associated with virus infec-
tion rather than the result of the transfusion procedure.
Changes in body weight (kg) and temperature (°C) were
also recorded and calculated in Figure 2 and Table 2. In
general, animals that received blood from ferrets infected
with high dose of virus showed decreased body weight
and increased body temperature relative to the recipients
that received blood from ferrets infected with low dose of
virus.
Viral RNA could be detected in the blood of both donors
and recipients
Transfusion of blood from ferrets infected with high
dose of virus resulted in the death of recipient ferrets
which positively correlated with levels of viral RNA [6].
We measured viral RNA in ferret blood collected from
donors on the day of transfusion, or from recipients on
day 2, 4, 8 post-transfusion as scheduled or before the
recipient died using the RT-qPCR assay. Viral RNA de-
tection in blood from donors and/or their appropriate
recipients are shown in Table 3. In the low dose group,
viral RNA in blood could be detected only in one donor
(1/6 ferrets) on day 10 post-infection; while 5/6 of
donors displayed viral RNA in their blood in the high
dose group. Partial identity of the viral matrix gene se-
quences with wild type sequence was found in the blood
of some recipients, which were analyzed using cDNA se-
quencing (Additional file 1: Figure S1) which provided
direct evidence of viremia.
Table 3 also showed that viral RNA could be detected
in the blood of 3/12 (25%) ferrets that received blood
from donors infected with low-dose of virus and 7/12
(58.33%) recipients that received blood from high-dose
infected donors. These data indicate that highly patho-
genic avian influenza A virus (H5N1) can be transmitted
through blood transfusion. Most recipients had detectable
viral RNA in blood collected on day 2 post-transfusion
while donor animals showed viremia after day 2 post-
infection (Figure 3A). We also found that most viremic re-
cipients died while recipients without viremia had 100%
survival (Figure 3B), indicating that viremia is associated
with fatal outcomes in ferrets infected with highly patho-
genic H5N1 influenza virus.
To understand the relationship of virus load in blood
with animal death, we recorded animal death and detect-
able virus load in blood. As shown in Table 4, viral RNA
levels greater than 8 × 104 fg/ml in blood were associated
with higher number of fatalities, while some recipients
with viral RNA of more than 3 × 104 fg/ml in blood also
did not survive. These data indicate that transfusion of
lower amount of virus load in blood could also result in
recipient animal death, and that high titers of viremia are
a strong predictor of fatality in the H5N1-infected host.
Higher levels of viral RNA were found in the blood of some
recipients after transfusion of blood collected in the early
viremic phase
Although viral RNA could not be detected in the blood of
animal #54, #56 from the low dose group and animal #60
Figure 1 Clinical signs of challenge with H5N1 virus A/VN/1203/04 in ferrets. 6 ferrets (donors) were infected with 1 × 102.6 EID50/ml (low
dose) of virus and 6 other donors were infected with 1 × 103.6 EID50/ml of virus. For each challenge dose, the donor animals were divided into
two groups; blood was collected on days 2 and day 6 post-infection from one of these groups and on days 4 and day 10 post-infection (or the
day before animal died) from the other group. At these time points about 2 ml of freshly collected blood was transfused into its appropriate
recipient. (A). Survival of ferrets after challenge. Ferrets (donors) were inoculated with either low dose or high dose of the virus and animal
survival was recorded up to 12 days post-challenge. (B) Ferrets (recipients) were transfused with blood collected from donor animals on days 2, 4,
6, and 10 post-infection, or on the day the donor animal died; survival was recorded up to 12 days post-transfusion.
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Figure 2 Changes in weights of ferrets (recipients) transfused with blood from infected donor animals. Ferrets (recipients) were
transfused with blood from infected donor animals on the day post-infection when blood was collected, day 2 (A), 4 (B), 6 (C), 10 (D). The
weights of ferrets were measured daily. The loss or gain of weight was calculated for each ferret as the percent change in the initial mean starting
weight on day 0. Values are the averages ± SD for the ferret(s) alive for each group.
Table 2 Changes in body temperatures of recipients animals
Day Day 2 Collected Day 4 Collected Day 6 Collected Day 10 Collected
Post- transfusion Low dose High dose Low dose High dose Low dose High dose Low dose High dose
0 0.00 ± 0.76 0.00 ± 1.93 0.00 ± 1.73 0.00 ± 1.02 0.00 ± 0.96 0.00 ± 1.40 0.00 ± 0.91 0.00 ± 1.54
1 2.00 ± 1.04 2.54 ± 0.30 0.63 ± 1.13 3.50 ± 1.13 1.23 ± 0.47 1.50 ± 0.95 0.03 ± 1.51 −1.30 ± 0.29
2 0.83 ± 0.72 2.44 ± 2.00 1.43 ± 1.97 4.53 ± 1.45 1.13 ± 0.50 2.27 ± 2.44 1.00 ± 1.08 −0.13 ± 1.28
3 3.43 ± 0.44 4.44 ± 0.71 0.50 ± 2.19 2.93 ± 1.54 1.83 ± 0.25 2.60 ± 1.31 1.73 ± 0.65 −1.13 ± 2.18
4 2.06 ± 1.82 2.77 ± 2.83 −0.80 ± 1.80 −0.62 ± 1.20 1.97 ± 1.88 3.20 ± 1.81 −1.94 ± 0.95 −1.63 ± 3.25
5 1.10 ± 1.48 2.07 ± 0.00 −1.03 ± 0.98 4.73 ± 0.00 2.37 ± 0.76 2.90 ± 1.57 2.40 ± 0.55 0.82 ± 0.35
6 1.06 ± 0.78 0.02 ± 1.48 −0.73 ± 2.24 3.93 ± 0.00 2.97 ± 0.72 2.75 ± 2.76 0.36 ± 1.80 −1.93 ± 3.54
7 0.46 ± 0.68 3.02 ± 1.91 −1.05 ± 0.07 3.23 ± 0.00 0.77 ± 1.80 3.20 ± 2.40 1.83 ± 2.19 −0.88 ± 0.35
8 0.46 ± 1.16 1.37 ± 1.27 0.65 ± 1.34 3.43 ± 0.00 1.07 ± 0.35 2.50 ± 2.69 0.26 ± 0.91 0.07 ± 0.00
9 0.20 ± 1.22 1.92 ± 2.47 −0.60 ± 0.71 1.73 ± 0.00 1.27 ± 1.72 3.50 ± 2.55 1.53 ± 0.26 0.07 ± 0.00
10 0.30 ± 0.45 2.12 ± 1.91 −2.95 ± 1.63 3.83 ± 0.00 1.13 ± 0.71 2.40 ± 2.69 −1.64 ± 2.19 0.07 ± 0.00
11 1.20 ± 0.57 0.32 ± 2.90 1.30 ± 1.56 2.73 ± 0.00 2.90 ± 0.75 3.85 ± 2.47 −0.17 ± 1.77 0.07 ± 0.00
12 1.33 ± 2.19 −1.78 ± 0.64 −1.70 ± 0.57 −0.87 ± 0.00 −0.23 ± 1.22 2.10 ± 0.14 2.13 ± 0.69 0.07 ± 0.00
Average 1.11 1.77 −0.33 2.54 1.42 2.52 0.58 −0.71
Note: Ferrets (recipients) were transfused with blood from infected donor animals on the day when blood was collected (Day collected), and body temperatures
were monitored daily by the use of subcutaneous implantable temperature transponders for 12 days post-transfusion. Each data point represents the mean
value ± SD for the surviving ferrets.
Wang et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014, 14:192 Page 5 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/14/192
from the high dose group, viremia was detected in the
blood of their recipients. Also some recipients given
blood from the high dose group had higher levels of
viral RNA than their donors on the day that blood was
collected (Table 3). Figure 3C showed that 1/1 (100%),
or 4/4 (100%) recipients of blood collected from donors
on day 2 or day 4 post-infection displayed increased viral
RNA in their blood (also see Table 3) after transfusion in
both virus dose groups relative to their donors and mortal-
ity was 100%. Some recipients that survived did not show
high amounts of viral RNA in their blood after transfusion
of blood from donors at day 6 post-infection or later.
These data indicated that higher titers of viral RNA could
be detected in recipients of blood collected in the early
viremic phase compared with the late viremic phase.
Viral loads were detectable in nasal wash from recipients
Previously we reported that virus could be detected
more frequently in the nasal washes of animals in the
high dose group compared with those in the low dose
Table 3 Viral load (fg/ml) in blood of ferrets (donors) infected with H5N1 virus, A/VN/1203/04 and the ferrets


















Low dose 51 2 0a >12 63 2,4,8 0 >12
6 0 >12 67 2,4,8 0 >12
52 2 0 >12 64 2,4,8 0 >12
6 0 >12 68 2,4,8 0 >12
53 2 0 >12 66 2,4,8 0 >12
6 0 >12 69 2,4,8 0 >12
54 4 0 >12 70 2 8.12 × 104 ± 5.17 × 102 6
4 5.77 × 105 ± 6.90 × 103
6 4.02 × 106 ± 3.94 × 105
10 0 >12 73 2,4,8 0 >12
55 4 0 >12 71 2,4,8 0 >12
10 7.62 × 104 ± 1.31 × 103 >12 74 2,4,8 0 >12
56 4 0 >12 72 2,4,8 0 >12
10 0 >12 75 4 1.33 × 104 ± 9.59 × 103 >12
High dose 57 2 0 7 76 2,4,8 0 >12
6 4.94 × 105 ± 5.27 × 104 79 8 2.11 × 104 ± 4.23 × 103 >12
58 2 0 >12 77 2,4,8 0 >12
6 0 80 2,4,8 0 >12
59 2 7.62 × 104 ± 3.57 × 103 6 78 2 2.30 × 106 ± 2.58 × 104 4
6 1.93 × 106 ± 6.95 × 105 81 2 2.01 × 104 ± 1.60 × 103 5
4 8.59 × 104 ± 5.63 × 103
60 4 0 7 82 2 4.51 × 106 ± 9.65 × 104 4
7 2.12 × 105 ± 2.35 × 104 85 2 5.81 × 105 ± 3.65 × 104 7
4 1.18 × 107 ± 5.99 × 105
61 4 0 8 83 2,4,8 0 >12
8 2.28 × 106 ± 5.94 × 105 86 4 4.79 × 104 ± 2.54 × 103 11
62 4 5.10 × 104 ± 2.37 × 103 8 84 2 9.76 × 104 ± 3.14 × 103 5
4 1.67 × 107 ± 5.96 × 105
8 1.33 × 104 ± 6.59 × 102 87 2,4,8 0 >12
PBS 49 4 0 88 8 0 >12
50 6 0 89 8 0 >12
62 10 0 90 8 0 >12
Note: a) 0 indicates that viral load could not be detectable in our experiment condition.
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group. Viral load was detected in nasal wash samples on
day 2 in both groups [6]. In this study, we tested viral
loads in the nasal wash from recipients and viral loads
were detected in these samples (Table 5). 8/10 of recipi-
ents with viremia had detectable viral loads in the nasal
wash, and two recipient animals (#81 and #79) with
viremia did not have detectable virus in the nasal wash
(compared Table 3 to Table 5). As shown in Table 5, there
was a positive association of viral load measured using
both RT-qPCR and TCID50 assays with lack of survival;
generally detection of a higher viral load in nasal wash was
associated with a decreased chance of recipient survival.
Viral load testing using the RT-qPCR assay was more
sensitive than the TCID50 assay. Twelve recipients dis-
played detectable viral loads in nasal wash using RT-qPCR
assay, while only 8/12 of animals showed positive viral
loads in the nasal wash (lg(TCID50/ml) >0.5) using TCID50
assay. These data indicate that H5N1 can be transmitted
by transfusion of viremic blood and that transfusion
resulted in increased virus levels in the recipient as evi-
denced by detectable viral load in the nasal wash of re-
cipients using both RT-qPCR assay and TCID50 assays.
High viral loads in blood and nasal wash of recipients
correlated with fatal outcomes in these animals.
In summary, 4/12 recipients (33.33%) who received
blood from donor ferrets infected with low dose displayed
viral RNA in blood and/or nasal washes. 10 of 12 recipi-
ents (83.33%) who received blood from donor ferrets in-
fected with high dose had detectable viral RNA in blood
and/or nasal wash.
Discussion
Although H5N1 infection of humans has been associated
primarily with infection of the respiratory tract, dissemin-
ation of virus to other organs, such as the brain, has also
been reported in several cases. Virus dissemination from
Figure 3 Viremia and related clinical signs. 6 ferrets (donors) were infected with 1 × 102.6 EID50/ml (low dose) of virus and 6 other donors
were infected with 1 × 103.6 EID50/ml of virus. For each challenge dose, the donor animals were divided into two groups; blood was collected on
days 2 and day 6 post-infection from one of these groups and on days 4 and day 10 post-infection (or the day before animal died) from the
other group. At these time points about 2 ml of freshly collected blood was transfused into its appropriate recipient. (A). Viremia is detectable in
ferrets post-challenge. Virus RNA was isolated from blood collected from animals on day after post-infection (donors)/transfusion (recipients), virus
loads were tested with RT-qPCR assay; and survival was recorded up to 12 days post-challenge. (B). % survival of recipient ferrets with viremia vs.
non-viremia. Recipients were followed up to 12 days post-transfusion; virus load was measured using an RT-qPCR assay. (C). H5N1 replication in
recipient ferrets. Viral loads in blood collected from recipients on day 2, day 4, day 6, and day10 post-transfusion, were detected using the RT-qPCR
assay; animal survival was recorded up to 12 days after challenge.
Wang et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014, 14:192 Page 7 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/14/192
lungs to extrapulmonary tissues most likely occurs by
viremia. The isolation of highly pathogenic influenza
H5N1 virus from the blood of 2 patients and the detec-
tion of viral RNA by RT-qPCR in the blood of 9 of 16
patients suggest that viremia can occur at high levels
and for prolonged periods in people with symptoms of
highly pathogenic influenza H5N1 virus infection [25].
Thus far, it has been shown that infection with both
avian H5N1 virus [14,17] and pandemic H1N1 (swine)
virus [22] can result in viremia, which is associated with
severe disease manifestations and fatal outcomes.
Ferrets develop a productive infection after inoculation
with human and avian influenza viruses without prior
adaptation of the virus. Experimental influenza virus in-
fections of ferrets have been used to model different as-
pects of influenza in humans [26]. The human isolate A/
Vietnam/1203/04 (H5N1) is one of the most pathogenic
virus isolates; and severity of disease was associated with
broad tissue tropism and high virus titers in multiple or-
gans, including the brain. High fever, weight loss, anorexia,
extreme lethargy, and diarrhea were observed as major
clinical signs and symptoms [6]. In addition, viral RNA is
frequently detected in blood one or two days before death
and viremia is associated with lethal outcomes [6].
Detection of virus in nasal washes is a key biomarker for
influenza virus infection. In our study we showed that
transfusion of viremic blood resulted in virus transmission
in the recipient and that virus could be detected in nasal
wash using RT-qPCR and TCID50 assays. Our study also
showed that viremia correlated with detectable viral load
in the nasal wash, and high amounts of virus in nasal wash
as detected by the TCID50 assay was associated with
recipient death (Tables 3 and 4).
Transfusion of blood collected on day 2 or day 4 post-
infection resulted in higher levels of viral RNA in the
blood of recipient ferrets and 100% fatality compared with
levels observed in ferrets who received blood at from day
6 or later post-infection. One explanation may be that at
the later periods of infection antibody production could
Table 4 The relationship between viral load (fg/ml) in










<8 × 104 >8 × 104 <3 × 104 >3 × 104
Low dose 54 >12 70 6
55 >12 74 >12
56 >12 75 >12
High dose 57 7 79 >12
59 6 78 4
81 5
60 7 82 4
85 7
61 8 86 11
62 8 84 5
87 >12
Note: data shown here only represented either animal of both donor and its
appropriate recipient that viral RNA can be detectable in their blood under
our experiment condition. And the animals with non-detectable (nd) viral RNA
in blood did not show here.
Table 5 Viral loads assay in nasal wash from recipient ferrets that viral RNA could be detectable using either RT-qPCR
or TCID50 assay
Group Animal code Day post- transfusion Viral RNA (fg/ml)
(mean ± SD)
lg (TCID50/ml) Survival (days
post-transfusion)
Low dose 70 2 1.20 × 104 ± 5.98 × 103 <0.5 6
6 1.36 × 107 ± 4.60 × 105 3.6
74 2 6.58 × 106 ± 2.54 × 104 0.5 >12
75 13 1.63 × 104 ± 3.92 × 103 <0.5 >12
69 14 2.01 × 104 ± 2.24 × 103 <0.5 >12
High dose 78 2 9.09 × 104 ± 6.82 × 103 1 4
82 2 2.11 × 106 ± 4.13 × 105 1.5 4
84 2 7.73 × 104 ± 1.29 × 103 <0.5 5
4 6.53 × 106 ± 5.43 × 105 3.84
85 2 2.75 × 108 ± 1.14 × 107 4.84 7
3 2.51 × 107 ± 8.52 × 106 0.5
86 2 2.72 × 104 ± 2.45 × 103 1.5 11
87 2 1.32 × 104 ± 5.97 × 103 1.5 >12
83 4 4.52 × 104 ± 2.57 × 103 <0.5 >12
80 14 1.71 × 104 ± 9.98 × 103 <0.5 >12
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have been initiated which would reduce potential for
transmission by immune complex formation (Additional
file 1: Table S1). However, these aspects of influenza trans-
mission by viremic blood would need to be explored
further.
The highly pathogenic influenza virus H5N1 has been
shown to infect multiple human organs other than the
lungs, suggesting that H5N1 can replicate in these or-
gans. Quantitative RT-PCR showed that high viral load
is associated with increased host responses [14]. High
viral loads have been found in lung, brain and blood
from ferrets infected with H5N1, A/VN/1203/04 and
virus could replicate in these tissues and damage cells in
these organs [6]. It has been reported that Influenza A
virus can infect and replicate in T lymphocytes and per-
ipheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs) [27], primary
T cells, and Jurkat cells [28]. Currently, it is not known
whether H5N1 viruses replicate in PBMCs and the type
of cells in PBMCs that could support replication needs
further investigation.
Conclusions
In conclusion, our study has shown that highly pathogenic
influenza A virus H5N1 can be transmitted through blood
transfusion in a susceptible ferret model under certain
conditions. These findings suggest that highly pathogenic
influenza strains may have broader tropism and therefore
may be transmitted by mechanisms other than the naso-
pharyngeal route. Although our current study does not
provide direct evidence of virus replication in blood,
H5N1 replication in blood cells may warrant further
exploration.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Table S1. Hemagglutination inhibition assay with
blood from ferrets challenged with H5N1 virus, A/VN/1203/04. Figure S1.
Alignment and compare of partial sequence of wild type (infection) M
(matrix) gene of H5N1 virus with these sequenced from bloods of some
recipients.
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